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Abstract: Public investments are dynamic in nature, and decision making must account for 
the uncertainty, irreversibility and potential for future learning. In this paper we adapt the 
theory for investment under uncertainty for a public referendum setting and perform the 
first empirical test to show that estimates of the value of a statistical life (VSL) from stated 
preference surveys are highly dependent on the inclusion of the option value. Our results 
indicate an option value of a major economic magnitude. This implies that previously 
reported VSL estimates, used in societal benefit-cost analysis of health investments, are 
exaggerated. 
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1. Introduction 
Public investments are generally irreversible by nature; once they are implemented they do 
not have to pass further market tests. Real option theory may be used to show how to take 
irreversibility of public projects into consideration in benefit-cost analysis. Using plausible 
parameter estimates it may be shown that the benefit-cost-ratio need to be higher than 3 
(not 1!) for an investment to increase social welfare (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). In addition, 
specific parameter estimates in benefit-cost analysis may be dependent on the option value. 
One important example is the value of a statistical life (VSL); in benefit-cost analysis of a 
typical road project in Sweden approximately 50 percent of the benefits consists of the value 
of increased road safety (Persson and Lindqvist, 2003).  
  Economists have used two different approaches to estimate VSL, the revealed 
preference (RP) and stated preference (SP) approach. RP studies have most commonly been 
based on wage differentials between different risky jobs, for a review see Viscusi and Aldy 
(2003). SP studies, on the other hand, use surveys where respondents are asked about their 
willingness to pay (WTP) for a private or a public good leading to a mortality risk reduction. 
For an overview of up to 70 SP studies with a road safety context, see de Blaiej et al. (2003).      
  The RP and SP method both have their advantages and disadvantages. The RP method 
has the benefit of being based on actual behavior. However, it must rely on the assumption 
that respondents are aware of the objective risk reductions. SP studies on the other hand 
have the benefit of being able to tailor-make surveys and directly communicate the risk 
reductions to respondents. However, SP studies rely on survey responses, which may be 
plagued by hypothetical bias (Murphy et al., 2005; Harrison, 2006). In addition, there are 
major concerns that respondents have cognitive difficulties to have well behaved   4 
preferences for very small changes in probabilities of mortality risk (Andersson and 
Svensson, 2007). 
  Another potential limitation of RP studies is that they are based on ex-post analysis of 
observed behavior not considering the dynamic nature of the decision process. SP studies 
are also usually based on a static setting. This may cause problems, considering that 
consumers constantly can change their purchasing decisions given new information about 
market conditions, substitute goods and other relevant factors. 
  Zhao and Kling (2001; 2004) and Corrigan, Kling and Zhao (2002) have shown how to 
implement theories of dynamic behavior in the formation of WTP. As they state: “In an 
explicitly dynamic setting characterized by uncertainty, irreversibility, and the potential for 
future learning, WTP for a good diverges from the standard variation measures”. Zhao and 
Kling define the compensation an individual will demand when forcing to take a decision 
now (and losing the option) the commitment cost.   
  The concept of option value when making irreversible decisions under uncertainty was 
first developed as a quasi-option value in the context of environmental economics by Arrow 
and Fisher (1974), Henry (1974), and Fisher and Hanemann (1986). Later, a further concept 
of option value was developed for applications in dynamic business investment decisions by 
McDonalds and Siegel (1986), Dixit (1992), Pindyck (1991) and Dixit & Pindyck (1994).
1 
During the same time, Hanemann (1989) integrated the concepts of Arrow and Fisher (1974) 
and of Henry (1974) into one unifying framework. Fisher (2000) claims that the concept of 
quasi-option value by Arrow, Fisher, Henry and Hanemann is equivalent to the option value 
by Dixit and Pindyck. However, Mensink and Requate (2005) rather argues that the option 
value by Dixit and Pindyck can be decomposed in two parts, one part measuring the value of 
                                                
1 McDonalds and Siegel (1986) explicitly point out the use of option value in the context of cost benefit analysis 
and decisions under uncertainty by policy makers.   5 
new information, which is equivalent to the quasi option value and one part reflecting the 
pure value of delaying a decision irrespective of uncertainty. In Zhao and Kling (2008) it is 
shown that the commitment cost (the reduction in willingness to pay necessary to 
compensate for giving up the opportunity to wait) is equal to the annualized quasi-option 
value. 
  The intuition behind the above mentioned quasi-option value is that in a situation 
when a respondent is uncertain about the utility she will derive from the good, there is a 
value of delaying the purchase decision until more information becomes available. Hence, if 
the respondent has to make a decision now, given the possibility for delay, she will want a 
compensation for this.  
  In this paper we set out the first empirical test of the real option theory for stated WTP 
for a public policy investment in road safety, reducing mortality risks. We do this using a CV 
survey in a Swedish city, where we ask respondents to vote yes or no to the implementation 
of a public policy program intended to increase road safety. This is a decision that shares the 
characteristics of an investment good where we can expect a real option value. It is 
irreversible, the outcomes are not certain (one cannot tell the exact magnitude of the actual 
risk reduction) and respondents may also be uncertain regarding their own utility from the 
safety improvement. The real option theory predicts that the current WTP will be lower, if 
there is opportunity for paying and implementing the public policy in the future. If there is 
an option value this may be important for how to design surveys eliciting VSL and how to 
interpret estimated values of safety for public policy decision making. If the option value is 
large enough it is important that the scenario description in stated preference studies 
mirrors the reality the policy maker actually faces. Also, it could be problematic to use   6 
estimates based on observed behavior, as this necessarily is an ex-post analysis where it is 
impossible to capture the dynamic nature of the decision process. 
  The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The second section outlines the 
theoretical framework for the study, and explicitly states the hypothesis that is to be tested 
based on the real option theory. The third section describes the CV survey and shows 
descriptive statistics. The fourth section shows the results. The VSL estimate in the real 
option sample is $3.4 million while in the non-real option sample it is $6.3 million. Hence, 
respondents in the real option sample places a considerable value to the real option of 
having the opportunity to wait and receive more information. It is also shown that the 
option value is higher when there is explicit uncertainty in the risk reduction, which is in line 
with theoretical expectations. In the last section we conclude with a brief discussion. The 
main point in the paper is that the result implies that we must question the estimates 
currently used in societal benefit-cost analysis of road investments, since they generally 
ignore the option value. Hence, it is important to explicitly design SP surveys such as the 
scenario mirrors the policy situation for which the estimates are to be used (dynamic or not), 
i.e. the option value is of such a considerable magnitude that a benefit-cost analysis cannot 
ignore it.  
  
2. Theoretical Framework 
A financial (call-) option is defined as the right but not the obligation to buy a certain asset at 
a certain time for a predetermined price. The real option approach views an investment 
opportunity in real capital as an option: the right but not the obligation to invest a certain 
amount and thereby claim the future cash flows from the investment. One real option is the   7 
timing decision: we can, but we do not have to, invest immediately. The possibility of 
delaying the investment is a real option and the associated flexibility has a positive value if 
there is uncertainty about future cash flows. 
  However, it has not yet been considered in the literature that the commitment to a 
public policy measure in a referendum has the characteristics of a real option: voting against 
a proposed public policy, e.g. in the Swedish referenda on whether to change currency to 
the Euro may give the opportunity to vote yes for it later, when uncertainty may be (partly) 
resolved. Once the majority has voted yes, it is in practice an irreversible action (e.g. because 
of imperfections in second hand markets or political conventions), and has an impact on the 
household budget. 
  In this paper we focus on a public policy measure that has the characteristics of an 
investment: you pay an amount for an asset now, as a road safety investment, in order to 
get a return from it in the future, such as increased road safety. The derived utility from this 
public policy is uncertain for the individual and it will depend on future income and exposure 
to traffic. The commitment to a public policy in a referendum may therefore be seen as an 
uncertain investment. With some adaptations we can analyze such commitment to a public 
investment with a standard real option model for optimal timing (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). 
Assume that the value (u) derived from the public investment for the typical voter evolves 
over time as follows: 
udz udt du s a + =   (1) 
This equation implies that the consumer, given the present information, knows the actual 
value of the public project to her (that is, if we invest immediately), but that the future value 
is always uncertain. We want to derive a rule for optimal timing of the public investment and 
denote the value of the option to invest as ( ) u F :   8 
( ) ( ) [ ]
T
T e p u E u F
r - - = max ,  (2) 
where T denotes the unknown future time of investment andr is the discount rate. For the 
existence of an optimum we must have that α < ρ. In the following we denote the difference 
ρ - α with δ. 
  The problem we have to solve is to choose an optimal time for the investment in the 
public project, that is, to pay the price p for a public project giving the utility u to the typical 
voter. As u evolves stochastically we will not be able to find any optimal point of time, but a 
critical value 
* u  determining that it is optimal to invest as 
* u u ³ . 
  In the continuation region, i.e. as long as it is not optimal to invest, the Bellman 
equation is: 
( ) dF E Fdt = r .  (3) 
Equation (3) states that the return from the project should balance with the total return 
from holding the asset (here the increase in value from the project). The value of the 
investment opportunity is dependent on the evolution of the utility derived from the 
project. Since the value to the voter is assumed to be stochastic, the evolution of the value 
from the investment opportunity is also stochastic and we can use Ito’s lemma to derive this 
process: 
( ) ( )( )
2
2
1 du u F du u F dF ¢ ¢ + ¢ = .  (4) 
 We can now substitute for duin the equation (4) and get the expected value: 
[ ] ( ) ( )dt u F u dt u F u dF E ¢ ¢ + ¢ =
2 2
2
1s a .  (5) 
The Bellman-equation can then be written as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0
2 2
2
1 = - ¢ + ¢ ¢ u F u F u u F u r a s .  (6) 
F(u) has to satisfy the following boundary conditions:   9 
( ) 0 0 = F   (7) 
p u u F - =
* *) ( .  (8) 
( ) 1 = ¢
* u F   (9) 
Equation (7) is an implication from the stochastic process assumed for the evolvement of 
utility and states that if utility reaches zero it will remain there so that the option to invest 
becomes worthless. Equation (8) is the value matching condition, which states that when we 
invest we receive the net payoff u
*-p. Equation (9) is the so-called smooth pasting condition. 
  In order to satisfy equation (7) the solution has to take the following form: 
( )
b Au u F =   (10) 











where b is a function of the parameters σ, ρ and δ. Since it can be shown that b>1, the 
critical value level u
* has to be larger than the price p one has to pay.  
  However, since we have a referendum, the voter cannot choose an optimal point of 
time, that is, to invest if 
* u u ³ . Instead, given that the referendum is taken place at an 
exogenously determined time t, we have that the voter only votes yes if at that point of time 
we have that: 
* u ut ³ , that is, the voter’s valuation has to be equal to or larger than the threshold value at 
the time the referendum is held.  We define the difference between the critical value u
* and 
p as the option value (OV): 
0
* > = - OV p u ,  (12) 
or, the critical value level u
* is p plus the option value:   10 
p OV u + =
* ,  (13) 
It is important to bear in mind that the option value OV is only present if the voter is given 
the option to defer the investment, that is, to wait for more information and to vote once 
again later. If this is her only opportunity to vote, she will vote yes if and only if:.  
t u p ³ ,  (14) 
since it can be shown that the option value is strictly positive given uncertainty, the 
following relationship has to hold strictly: 
( ) ( ) ( ) p option no u OV p option u option u t t t = > + = ³
* * .  (15) 
We assume further that the unknown voter valuation ut is uniformly distributed in the 
interval [0,p
max] and hence the probability to vote yes (Pr) is monotonically decreasing with 









u u t t . 
(16) 
Thus, we arrive at the following empirically testable result: 
( ) ( ) option no option Pr Pr < .  (17) 
Hence, we expect that there is a lower probability to vote yes in the presence of a real 
option for the typical voter compared to the situation without such an option. 
  By differentiating equation (11) we can derive some comparative static properties of 
the solution. The volatility increases the option value since the future becomes more 
uncertain. In section 4.2 this hypothesis is also put to an empirical test. The effect of the 
discount rate is less clear: all things equal the option value will be less for a higher discount 
rate since the future becomes less important. However, we would also expect that the 
future growth rate of the utility derived from the project should increase so the net effect is 
uncertain. However, for financial call options the second effect dominates so that the option   11 
value increases with the discount rate. Similarly, the effect of an increase in risk aversion is 
ambivalent and depends on the net effect on ρ and α. This reasoning based on financial 
market equilibrium is still more complicated for public investments since there are not 
always complete markets or spanning assets for the payoffs from the public investment.  
  It could be argued that the real option approach leads to a postponement of 
investments, since instead of investing now we will wait and see and maybe invest in the 
future. However, even if some investments will be made later when considering the option 
value it is clearly optimal to do so. Considering the option value increases the threshold for 




3.1. The CV Survey 
To test the real option theory in the formation of WTP for road safety improvements we 
conducted a mail survey in the spring of 2007 to 940 randomly selected residents in the city 
of Karlstad, Sweden. All respondents were described to a background of which there are on 
average 6 fatalities each year due to road accidents in Karlstad (mean between 1998 and 
2005). Hence, we presented the fatalities in frequencies rather than in probabilities, which is 
easier for respondents to understand. Further, we use the community analogy to describe 
the scenario to increase the individuals’ association to the proposed program (Kalman and 
Royston, 1997). The respondents were described to a local public program intended to 
reduce the number of fatalities by half. To test between the dynamic and the static scenario,   12 
one half of the respondents were given surveys where they were asked to decide on a 
proposition that included a real option.
2  
  Further, we included sub-samples that were described to a scenario with uncertainty 
regarding the risk reduction. The reason is that we wish to test if the option value is higher 
when there is uncertainty in the outcome as according to theoretical expectations, discussed 
in the previous section. In one sub-sample the uncertainty was described such that the 
annual fatalities will decrease from the baseline (six fatalities) to between two and four 
fatalities, with a reduction to three as the most likely outcome. In the other sub-sample the 
risk reduction was described to be from the baseline to between one and five fatalities, also 
here with a reduction to three fatalities as the most likely outcome. Hence, this corresponds 
to a triangular distribution of the risk reductions. The structure of the survey is shown in 
Figure 1.    
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
  The sample without the real option was told that this was their “now or never” 
opportunity to decide on the issue. This was described as: “…We also ask you to consider 
that the situation is such that the road safety program will be implemented either now or it 
will never be implemented. Consider the situation that this is your only opportunity to give 
your vote regarding the possible implementation of the traffic safety program”. Whereas the 
respondents with the real option were told that even if the vote came to a no now, they 
would get another chance to give a final vote later when a new local referendum would be 
held. Benefits would then also be delayed. This was described in the following way: “if the 
                                                
2 The survey (translated to English) is available from the authors upon request.   13 
safety program is not implemented now, considerer that a new referendum will be held later 
where you will be asked the same question. At that point all new information regarding the 
safety program will be made available to you. For example, more time can be devoted to see 
which safety measures will be most efficient for the particular urban environment in Karlstad. 
You will also have time to consider your own valuation regarding the safety program.”  Later 
in the survey it was explicitly stated that the possible later vote would be in one year.  
  After the description of the traffic safety program, the respondents were asked to vote 
yes or no to implement the public policy at a certain annual cost (5 different bid levels were 
used) and that it would be implemented at the stated cost if a majority supported the 
program. The survey also collected information on socio-demographics as well as some 
general risk preferences. A total of 465 respondents completed the survey, controlling for 
incorrect addresses, this gives a response rate of 55 percent.  
3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Characteristics of the sample are shown in Table 1 below. There are slightly more females in 
the sample (54%) and the educational level is above average. We also see that on average 
54% of the respondents vote in favor of the safety program. This is just a raw average, 
without controlling for e.g. the different bid levels. Table 1 indicates that the only significant 
difference between the two groups (real option vs. non-real option) concerns whether they 
have children in the household or not. We control for this in the later statistical analyses 
(and kids do not seem to influence the probability of voting yes to the public investment). 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
   14 
In Figure 2 the proportion of respondents voting in favor of the safety program is shown in 
more detail and separated for the real option and non-real option sub-sample. We see that 
the share of respondents voting in favor of the program decreases as the stated cost 
increases. It is also evident that at all bid levels the share of respondents voting in favor are 
higher among those that do not have the real option, i.e. already here we see that 
respondents given an offer including a real option tend to place a value on the option. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
At the lowest stated cost (200 SEK) almost all of the respondents that were not offered the 
real option vote in favor of the program. For the two higher levels of stated cost the 
percentages of respondents voting in favor of the program is around 30%. In the next section 
we perform multivariate analyses estimating the real option value. 
 
4. Estimations and Results 
In this section multivariate analysis is performed such that in section 4.1 we test the 
hypothesis that respondents in the real option sample are more likely to vote no the public 
safety program. Section 4.2 tests the hypothesis that the option value is higher when there is 
explicit uncertainty in the risk reduction, i.e. respondents in the real option sample that were 
also in the sub-samples with uncertainty in the risk reduction are even more likely to vote 
no. Finally, section 4.3 concluded this section and estimates the value of a statistical life in 
the real option and non-real option sample.   15 
4.1. Baseline Results 
Table 2 shows the likelihood of voting in favor of the safety program, i.e. the dependent 
variable is a binary variable taking the value equal to one if the respondent voted yes to the 
public safety program. Results are shown for the full sample and for the the real option and 
non-real option sub-samples, respectively. Table 2 shows the marginal effects from the logit 
estimations.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
The coefficient of the Bid variable is significant in all models, which may be seen as a validity 
test of the survey. The variable of most interest, RO, captures the real option effect and 
shows statistical and economic significance in both Model A and Model B. The negative 
coefficient implies that a respondent who faces the opportunity to wait and see (the real 
option sub-sample) is less likely to vote in favor of the safety program. Having the real option 
decreases the probability of voting in favor with 28 percent in Model A and with 27 percent 
in Model B. The effect is according to the theoretical expectations from the real option 
theory.   
  Regarding socio-economic covariates, gender is found to be associated with a higher 
likelihood of voting in favor of the safety program. This result is in line with results on 
gender-related risk behavior (Byrnes et al., 1999). In the full sample, being female increases 
the likelihood of voting yes with 10 (Model B) to 11 percent (Model A). Regarding age two 
different models are used, treating age as continuous and using different age-categories. In 
the model using age categories respondents below age of 30 are used as the reference 
group. The estimates indicate an inverted U-shape, where middle-aged respondents tend to   16 
be more likely to vote in favor of the program. Such a result has been reported in other 
studies estimating WTP for risk reductions, see e.g. Johannesson et al. (1997). The coefficient 
of the variable Own is statistically significant, which shows that respondents that perceive 
that their baseline risk as higher than the average are more likely to support the safety 
program. In the non-real option sub-sample there are indications that respondents with a 
university education are more likely to vote yes, most other covariates are not statistically 
significant.    
4.2. The impact of volatility on the option value  
As outlined in the end of section 2 the partial derivative of the solution to the real option 
model with respect to volatility yields that higher volatility in future benefits σ increases the 
threshold value, i.e., the investment project is more likely to be deferred (for technical 
details see Dixit and Pindyck (1994)).  This is in accordance with intuition, since the 
possibility of higher project values in the future increases, while the downside risk is 
unchanged. Hence option value of waiting increases with volatility.  
  To test whether higher volatility increases the real option value as predicted, we use 
the following empirical strategy. First, if we take the partial derivative of equation 11 we 
implicitly assume that the other coefficients in the model are constant. This assumption 
implies that respondents are risk neutral, otherwise increased volatility might change the 
subjective discount rate and the demanded return from the investment so that δ is affected. 
The net effect on the real option value would therefore be unclear. As mentioned in section 
2, this argument is based on the assumption of complete markets and spanning assets that 
might not be applicable for individual valuation of hypothetical safety projects. We 
exogenously change the level of uncertainty and this uncertainty is not traded in financial   17 
markets. Since a real option is basically insurance, risk averse individuals should also value 
real options more highly when facing an uncertain outcome. However, we want to isolate 
the volatility effect on the real option value (that is, the probability to vote yes). Hence, if we 
give the volatility treatment to our two groups we can only argue that the effect is due to 
the impact of volatility on real option value if we assume risk neutral respondents. Going 
from postulated certainty to uncertainty will probably also have an effect on risk averse 
individuals in the sample without the real option in their probability to vote yes. Only for risk 
neutral individuals would we expect that going from certainty to uncertainty should have no 
effect (since the expected value does not change). Hence, the change in probability to vote 
yes can only be attributed to the effect of volatility on the real option valuation. Moreover, 
the adapted real option framework in section 2 we choose for deriving our empirical 
hypotheses is based on risk neutral decision makers.  
  Hence, in order to test for the impact of volatility, we consider only the answers of risk 
neutral respondents. We use a standard question for elicitation of respondents risk 
preferences (Daruvala, 2007), which minimizes loss aversion effects compared to the 
standard reservation price method: “You are presented with two alternatives below. 
Alternative 1: A die is thrown and (i) In the case of an odd number you receive 0 SEK, and (ii) 
in the case of an even number you receive 1000 SEK. Alternative 2: You are unconditionally 
given C SEK. For what value of C do you consider Alternative 1 to be as good as Alternative 2? 
Answer: I like both alternatives equally when C = _______ Swedish kronor” 
  According to the expected utility model we define the respondents as risk neutral if 
their certainty equivalent C is equal to the expected payoff from the game (500 SEK).
3 We 
                                                
3. The answers indicate that approx. 64 percents were risk-neutral, 20 percent were risk-seeking (risk-loving) and 
16 percent were risk-averse.  Note that the sum the respondents “played” for (1,000 SEK) is the average value of 
the bid level in the CV survey. We also made sensitivity analyses defining risk-neutrality as respondents in the   18 
thereafter estimate the following model for the risk neutral individuals, separately for the 
group with the real option and the group without real option.  
0 1 2 Vote BID VOL b b b g e = + + + + x   (18) 
The model contains socio-economic covariates (x) and the bid level. Further, the dummy 
variable VOL is referring to a volatile scenario description where the risk reduction has the 
same expected outcome as the standard scenario but has a certain maximum and minimum 
outcome as described in section 3.1. 
  Considering that the respondents included in the model are risk-neutral we expect that 
in the group that was not offered the real option there will be no effect on the option value 
due to the volatile scenario description. In contrast, in the group that was offered the real 
option we expect the option value of waiting to be higher in the group with the volatile 
scenario description. The marginal effects from the logit estimation of equation 18 are 
reported in table 3 below. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
As expected, the results show that there are no effects of volatility in the group without the 
real option. In comparison, volatility has a significant effect on the probability for voting yes 
in the real option group. The volatile scenario decreases the probability for voting yes with 
23 percent, which correspondence to a considerable higher real option value. The results are 
robust with respect to the inclusion of control variables regarding the magnitude and 
statistical significance of the marginal effects. 
                                                                                                                                                   
interval 495 to 505 and 490 to 510 SEK, which do not qualitatively change the results based on the strict 
definition of risk neutrality shown in the paper   19 
4.3. VSL Estimates 
To estimate the VSL, the probability of voting in favor of the program is estimated using a 
logistic model as in section 4.1. The mean WTP ( p) is defined as the area under the survivor 
function, shown in Figure 2, for positive WTP ( p): 
( ) ( )
0
1
1 1 ln 1




-D   = + =- +   ∫ ,  (19) 
where βx is the constant term in the changed utility  v D . Using a bivariate model mean WTP 
can then be estimated as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) constant 1 log 1 exp bid p b b = - × + .  (20) 
Using this we estimate mean WTP to 1,600 SEK without the real option and to 855 SEK with 
the real option. Dividing the WTP with the risk reduction we get the following estimates of 
VSL with and without the real option shown in Table 4. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
The results indicate that the VSL without the real option is approx. 42.5 million SEK ($6.3 
million) and with the real option VSL today is around 22.8 million SEK ($3.4 million)
4. Using a 
bootstrap approach with 1,000 replications we estimate the standard deviation to be 8.3 
($1.2 million) and 3.8 million SEK ($0.6 million), respectively. This implies that the two 
estimates are also statistically significantly different from each other at the 10 percent level. 
The economic difference between the estimates is clearly substantial and implies a real 
option value of almost 20 million SEK ($3 million).  
                                                
4 $1=6.72 SEK, 2008-09-16   20 
  We also compare the results with a standard
5 VSL study conducted in the city of 
Karlstad three months prior to the study reported in this paper (Svensson, 2007). The VSL 
estimate from the standard VSL study, using the same bid levels and risk reductions, was 50 
million SEK ($7.4 million). This is not statistically significant from the estimate based on the 
scenario without the real option in this paper at 42.5 million SEK.    
 
5. Policy Implications 
Real option theory shows that the net-present-value criterion is not appropriate for public 
policy decision making if investments are irreversible. It has been shown that by including 
the option value to wait and see regarding irreversible investments, the benefit-cost ratio 
needs to be higher than 3, rather than only 1. Considering the option value increases the 
threshold for investing immediately since we need compensation for the lost opportunity to 
wait for more information. In this paper we have also shown that specific parameter 
estimates used in benefit-cost analysis can be heavily exaggerated if the irreversibility of 
investments is not taken into consideration. The results also indicated that the real option 
value depends positively on the degree of volatility. A large degree of uncertainty heightens 
the threshold for immediate investment. In the context of VSL, the benefits are even more 
exaggerated if there is a high degree of objective uncertainty or perceived subjective 
uncertainty. Policy has therefore to be concerned with reducing project risks by more 
elaborated techniques for planning and evaluation and managing the perceived risks from 
the voters through better provision of information.  
                                                
5 By this we refer to not explicitly stating that it is a “now or never” or “now or later” decision.  Hence, a design 
used by all previous studies in the VSL literature.    21 
  It is important that the scenario description in stated preference studies mirror the 
reality the policy maker actually faces. If there is a possibility for delaying an irreversible 
investment with uncertain benefits for the average citizen where there will be arrival of new 
information over time, willingness to pay will be overestimated if this is not explicitly 
outlined in the survey. On the opposite, if we want to evaluate a measure that has to be 
taken “now or never”, not explicitly describing this in the scenario will underestimate the 
willingness to pay.  
  For public health investments such as traffic safety measures it seems that a “now or 
later” scenario description is usually most appropriate, since not making the safety measure 
now does not mean that the opportunity to implement the safety measure in the future is 
lost.  
  As most studies estimating the VSL do not have an explicit description whether it is a 
“now or never” or a “now or later” decision, the estimated VSL will depend on the implicit 
assumptions made by the respondents. Since these implicit assumptions could vary 
systematically with the different scenarios there is a likely bias in these estimates. Generally 
we believe that VSL estimates used in public policy decision making, based on SP studies, 
exaggerate the benefit of the investment. Considering the comparison mentioned section 
4.3 with a standard VSL study performed approximately at the same time in the same city, it 
seems like respondents interpret standard VSL studies as a “now or never” decision. 
  Our result also has a more general implication. Clearly, a real option model can 
describe individual voting behavior and consumption with investment characteristics. It 
might e g provide an explanation for the observed status quo preservation in public 
referenda held in the EU during the last decade.  
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Tables 
Table 1  
Descriptive statistics: mean (std. dev.) 
Variable  Description  Full Sample  Real Option Sample  Non Real Option Sample 














































Own  Subjective risk perception 







# Observations  428  223  205 
 
Table 2  
Marginal effects from Logit estimation, dependent variable: Vote 
  Full sample  Real Option Sample  Non-Real Option Sample 
  Model A  Model B  Model C  Model D  Model E  Model F 
Age  2.39E-03  -  2.73E-03  -  8.83E-04  - 
Age 30-44  -  0.05  -  -0.02  -  0.12 
Age 45-64  -  0.13
*  -  0.10  -  0.13 
Age 65+  -  0.01  -  0.06  -  -0.12 
Income  4.74E-04  1.64E-04  2.31E-04  3.67E-04  5.49E-04  -7.68E-04 
Gender  0.11
**  0.10
*  0.06  0.05  0.13
*  0.12
* 
University  0.08  0.08  0.02  0.03  0.14
*  0.13
* 
Kids  0.02  3.70E-03  9.98E-05  0.02  0.05  -0.01 
RO  -0.28
***  -0.27
***  -  -  -  - 













N  428  428  223  223  205  205 
Pseudo-R
2  0.13  0.13  0.08  0.08  0.15  0.16 
Note: Two-tailed significance tests: 
*** 0.01 level, 
** 0.05 level, 
* 0.10 level. 
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Table 3  
Test of volatility on the option value 
  Real Option Sample  Non-Real Option Sample 
  Model G  Model H  Model I  Model J 
Age  -4.58E-03  -  5.00E-03  - 
Income  1.54E-06  -  -2.85E-06  - 
Gender  -0.02  -  0.20
*  - 
University  0.02  -  0.18  - 
Kids  0.06  -  0.06  - 
VOL  -0.23
*  -.21
*  -0.06  0.01 






N  88  88  94  94 
Pseudo-R
2  0.08  0.04  0.20  0.18 
Note: Two-tailed significance tests: 
*** 0.01 level, 
** 0.05 level, 
* 0.10 level. 
 
Table 4  
VSL estimates  
  With real option  Without real option 
VSL estimates  22.8 million SEK ($3.4 million )  42.5 million SEK ($6.3 million) 
Option value  19.7 million SEK ($3 million)   27 
Figures 
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